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TAXATION - INCOME TAX - TAXABILITY OF INCOME OF ALIMONY TRUST TO HusBAND-SETTLOR-RULE oF DouGLAs v. WILLCUTS - Three recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States, H elvering v. Fitch,1 H elvering v. Leonard,2 and H elvering v.
Fuller,8 all involving an application of the rule of Douglas v. Willcuts, 4

(U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 427.
(U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 780.
8 (U. s. l 940) 60 s. Ct. 784.
"296 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 59 (1935). The parties entered an agreement under
which the husban:l was to create a trust for the benefit of the wife. She was to receive
a stipulated amount of income yearly therefrom; the manner of making up deficiencies
was prescribed; and any surplus was to be paid to the husband, who also had the reversionary interest. This was accepted in lieu of and in full settlement of alimony,
dower, statutory claims and claims for support. The divorce decree ordered that the
trust be set up according to the agreement. By statute, the divorce court had power
to provide for th(: creation of the trust, was given full control over it and could later
modify it by any :>rder which would have been proper in the original decree. Holding
that the husband was taxable on the income, the Court said that the decree merely
imposed sanctions upon a "preexisting duty" of the husband; that the substance was
the same as thou~:h he had received the income and paid it over to the wife under
the decree. As to the statutory basis for the tax, the Court said: "We think that the
definitions of gros; income •.. are broad enough to cover income of that description."
296 U. S. l at 9. The Court expressly rejected those sections dealing with the taxation
of trusts and fidi:ciaries (p. 9) and those dealing with the situations in which the
grantor remained taxable (p. 10). This case is discussed in 20 M1NN. L. REv. 538
(1936); 34 M1c1-1. L. REv. 443 (1936); 24 CAL. L. REv. 474 (1936). Discussing
the decision below, Willcuts v. Douglas, (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 130, cf. 48
HARV. L. REv. 8:t5 (1935); 33 M1cH. L. REv. 634 (1935); 83 UNiv. PA. L. REv.
534 (1935).
1

2

1286

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

raise the question of what that rule means in its practical application.5
Stated briefly, that rule is that the income from a so-called alimony
trust is taxable to the husband-settlor whenever it discharges a continuing obligation for him.
I.

In the Fitch case, an alimony trust was included in a property settlement, confirmed by the divorce decree. The husband assumed no obligation other than to create the trust. He was held taxable on the income
from the trust under Douglas v. Willcuts because he had failed to show
"that in Iowa divorce law the court has lost all jurisdiction to alter or
revise the amount of income payable to the wife from an enterprise
which has been placed in trust," 6 hence he had failed to show by "clear
and convincing proof . . . that local law and the alimony trust have
given . . . a full discharge and leave no continuing obligation however
contingent." 7
In the Leonard case, the parties entered into a separation agreement
while their divorce was pending. This agreement incorporated by reference a trust agreement, which in turn provided for an irrevocable trust
of cash and certain securities, the husband undertaking to guarantee the
payment of the principal and interest of certain bonds included. The
separation agreement, which was affirmed and made a part of the
divorce decree, made other property settlements, provided for the
release of dower, etc., and also provided for an additional payment by
the husband to the wife of $35,000 yearly. The Court held that the
husband was properly taxable on the whole income of the trust. As to
the bonds, a continuing obligation was found in the undertaking to
guarantee the payment of the principal and interest when due. As to
the balance of the trust, while the Court conceded that under New
York law, a property settlement could not be modified under the
statutory reserved power, even though incorporated in the decree, it
was found that such settlements could be remade by the divorce court
like any other settlement between husband and wife. Consequently,
as defendant had not sustained the burden of proof imposed by the
Fitch case, he was held to be taxable as to that income.
In the Fuller case, the parties entered an agreement in contempla5 The article of Randolph E. .Paul, "Five Years with Douglas v. Willcuts," 53
HARV. L. REv. I (1939), fully discusses the consequences of that case up to the fall
of 1939. The present comment does not go beyond the questions raised by the recent
cases; nor is the question of the propriety of the rule taxing trust income to the settlor
where it discharges his legal obligation here considered. On the liability of settlors of
irrevocable short term trusts, see 38 M1cH. L. REv. 885 (1940).
6 Helvering v. Fitch, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 427 at 430.
7 Ibid., 60 S. Ct. 427 at 430.
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tion of their divorce, which provided for the creation by the husband
of an irrevocable trust of certain stock, the income to be applied to the
support and maintenance of the wife for ten years, with the corpus
over to her absolutely at the end of that time. The agreement provided
for a waiver of all other claims growing out of the marital relation, and
for the payment of an additional $40 per week by the husband for a
specified time. The divorce decree approved the agreement. The Court
found that under Nevada law the wife's allowance was final unless the
decree reserved power to modify it, or approved a settlement which
provided for modification. It was held that, as no such power was
reserved here, the duty of defendant was fully discharged and the
income from the trust was not taxable to the husband under the rule
of Douglas v. Willcuts.
2.

The rationale of Douglas v. Willcuts apparently 8 was that as the
divorce court could modify the decree and increase the obligation of
the husband, he could not have been completely discharged, therefore
the obligation continued to exist, and consequently the income from the
trust thus used to discharge the settlor's continuing obligation was
properly taxable to him. 9 There were three important factors present
in that case which might have influenced that decision. 10 ( r) By statute,
the divorce court had power to appoint a trustee to receive and invest
property paid to the wife and turn the income over to her; ( 2) by
Minnesota law, the court could modify its decree not only in regard to
the alimony provisions, but also in regard to the trust provisions; (3)
the husband had undertaken to make up deficiencies in the trust income. Under the Fitch case, it would seem that the power of the divorce
court to modify its decree is the controlling factor. In its last analysis,
that case seems to be one of judicial legislation, designed to plug what
was considered to be a hole in the income tax law, whereby the income
from such trusts would escape taxation. That feeling was based on the
proposition that "amounts paid to a divorced wife under a decree for
alimony are not regarded as income of the wife." 11 In support of that
8 "Apparently" is advisedly used in this case, for it would be presumptive to
state authoritatively what that case really means.
9 "The reason given to support such a conclusion is that the liability of the
settler for taxes on trust income is based on the possibility that the settler may be
called upon for additional sums in the future. If the obligation continues, the tax
liability continues. If the obligation is ended, the tax liability is ended." Justice Reed,
dissenting, Helvering v. Fuller, (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 784 at 788.
1 °Four are listed by Paul, "Five Years with Douglas v. Willcuts," 53 HARV. L.
REV. l at 7 (1939).
11 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. lat 8, 57 S. Ct. 59 (1935).
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proposition, the Court cited Gould v. Gould 12 and Audubon v. Shufeldt.18 Unless Douglas v. Willcuts itself decided that proposition, it is
without foundation, for neither of the cases cited so hold.14 Even assuming the validity of that proposition, there seems to be no good reason
for extending it so as to hold that the amounts received by the wife
from a so-called alimony trust are not taxable income. If that proposition is baseless, it is hard to see why such income is not taxable under
section r6r (a) (2 ).15
Assuming now that the Court was correct in its proposition that
alimony is not taxable income and that there was a loophole in the
income tax law, the results of Douglas v. Willcuts are still undesirable,
for as a matter of practical administration, the rule of this case leaves
too many variables to be determined and too many questions unanswered. In its requirement that the taxpayer show by "clear and convincing'' proof that under local law his obligation is fully discharged, it
imposes an unreasonable, if not impossible burden. For example, in the
Fitch case, defendant failed to establish his case because, as the Court
conceded, "on this state of the Iowa authorities we can only speculate
as to the power of the Iowa court to modify...." 16 If the local law
is thus unsettled, how can the taxpayer ever sustain his burden? What
does this burden involve? If the basis of the decision is that an obligation of the husband is being paid by the trust income, thereby making
him the real beneficiary, then logically the inquiry should go further
than merely to ask whether the divorce court may have power to modify the trust decree.
245 U.S. 151, 38 S. Ct. 53 (1917).
181 U.S. 575, 21 S. Ct. 735 (1901).
14 Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 38 S. Ct. 53 (1917), held only that, under
the rule that tax statutes should be construed in a manner most favorable for the taxpayer, alimony was not income as defined by the Revenue Act of 1913. Although not
patent in the decision, the Court seemed to feel that as such payments were not deductible from the husband's income and as he was already taxable on those amounts
they should not be taxed a second time as income of the wife. If it meant to go
further and hold that in no event was alimony income of the wife, then it was an
unwarranted extension of the authority there cited. It too relied upon Audubon v.
Shufeldt, I 8 I U. S. 57 5, 21 S. Ct. 73 5 ( I 90 I), which held merely that under the
definitions of "debt" in the Bankruptcy Act of I 8 98, accrued alimony was not a
provable debt so as to be discharged by an adjudication.
15 Prior provisions are re-enacted by the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 53
Stat. L. 66, § 161 (a): "The taxes imposed by this chapter upon individuals shall apply
to the income of estates or of any kind of property held in trust, including . . • ( 2)
Income which is to be distributed currently by the fiduciary to the beneficiaries.•••"
16 Helvering v. Fitch, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 427 at 430.
·
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3.
It is not entirely clear just what the husband's obligation is. 11 As
a general proposition, the common-law duty to support is terminated
by a divorce; alimony is a statutory substitute imposed by the divorce
court. On the face of the matter, it would seem that necessarily it is
the latter obligation that is meant.18 If this is so, then it would seem
that the only duties imposed by the decree are the ones which that decree
itself requires. Assuming that the court may, at some later time, modify
the decree and impose a greater obligation upon the husband, if the
original decree requires the creation of a trust, why is not the duty
imposed by that decree as fully discharged by the creation of that trust
until such time as the court sees fit to increase that obligation as it is
when there is no such reserved power? This distinction is difficult to
discern.
In this connection, it should also be asked by whom the divorce
was sought and on what grounds, for under local law ( and, "an inquiry
into state law seems inescapable" 19 ) , those factors often affect the
wife's right to demand alimony and the court's power to grant it. If
the trust is created in a situation where the wife could not demand it
and the court could not have ordered it, where, or what, is the obligation of the husband? or are we to say that the trust agreement itself
created the obligation? ~ It should also be asked in this connection
17 In Helvering v. Leonard, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 780, two different obligations were found, wholly apart from the fact whether the court had power to modify
the decree. The first was the guarantee by the husband of the payment of the bonds.
It is difficult to see how this fits into the Douglas v. Willcuts picture. If this argument
is carried to its logical conclusion, then whenever a principal debtor pays off his obligations, it may be considered as income of his surety. The other "obligation" was
found in the fact that the court couid overhaul a contract made between husband and
wife where it was unfair, inequitable, unjust or where there was overreaching. If this
is sufficient to make the obligation a continuing one, then it would seem as though the
obligations incurred by a husband in any antenuptial or postnuptial agreement, even
though he had presently performed all the covenants, would be continuing, and therefore the income received by the wife thereunder taxable to him. It is submitted that
both of these "obligations" are very dissimilar from those upon which the Court
based its result in Douglas v. Willcuts. If the Leonard case is an application of that
doctrine, as it purports to be, it is an unwarranted and extreme extension of the position
taken in the Douglas case,
18 Yet the Court speaks of the divorce decree imposing certain sanctions upon a
"preexisting duty of the husband" in the Douglas case, 296 U. S. 1 at 8, and again in
the Fitch case, 60 S. Ct. 427 at 430. If by this language the Court meant that the
common-law duty was continued, it created further difficulties in the application of the
rule, as will be seen from the questions raised later in this note.
19 Helvering v. Fuller, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 784 at 787.
20 That position was taken in Glendinning v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1938)
97 F. (2d) 51.
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whether the agreement was a property settlement or an alimony settlement, and whether it was in lieu of alimony, dower, or other property
claims, for this may be important in determining whether or not the
court is bound by the agreement of the parties. For instance, if it is a
property settlement the court may be bound. In most cases, the trust
is accepted in lieu of alimony, dower and all other property claims, so
this point is left obscure. If the court is not bound, but may approve
and confirm the agreement as its own, to what extent can the court
modify its decree when it does confirm or approve such a settlement?
It is not infrequent that the local law permits a modification in regard
to alimony agreements, but refuses it as to property settlement. In such
a case, is the income from the trust to be allocated, part to the property
settlement and part to the alimony settlement? Or would the assumption that the whole was intended as alimony be justified? 21 And what
of the case where the trust is accepted in lieu of dower claims as well?
The income from a trust in lieu of dower has been held to be taxable
to the wife. 22 ls there any logical reason for distinguishing between this
and a trust in lieu of alimony? And is the income to be apportioned in
this case? Or is that part which might be said to be paid in lieu of dower
to be taxable to the husband? 23 Again it may be asked whether an
assumption that the entire trust income is paid- in lieu of alimony can
be justified.
Having found that the court does have power to modify and that
this is the type of a decree that can be modified, it is necessary to consider by whom the decree may be reopened. Can the court modify on
its own motion, or only on application by one of the parties? Or must
both parties apply? And what showing must be made on application to
secure a modification? 24 If the continuity of the obligation turns on the
possibility that an increased burden might later be imposed, then these
last questions would seem to be fully as important as the mere question
of the power of the court. But assuming that a continuing obligation
may be found, what is the extent thereof and by what is it measured?
In general, the common-law obligation to support a wife is determined
by the husband's station in life, his income and standard of living. Is
it sound to assume, as the cases apparently do, that the entire trust in21 That assumption seems to have been made in both the Fuller case and the
Leonard case. -In both, there were provisions for additional payments by the husband
which might well have been intended to be the only alimony provisions, the balance
being intended as a property settlement.
22 Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U.S. 365, 54 S. Ct. 221 (1933).
28 This seems to have been done in all four of these cases, although in Douglas
v. Willcuts the Court distinguished Helvering v. Butterworth.
24 In this regard, it might be noted that in the Douglas case, the divorce court
had power to modify any provision, on application of either party.
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come is necessary for the proper support of the wife? 25 The imposition
of the tax is rationalized on the theory that the e:ffect is the same as
though the income had been paid to the husband, who in turn paid it
over to the wife, so that he is the true beneficiary. But quaere, is he
benefited beyond the extent of his obligation as measured by his common-law duty? 26
It will now be seen that, turning as it does on the possibility of the
court's imposing an increased obligation on the husband in the future,
the inquiry cannot stop merely with asking whether or not the divorce
court, as a general proposition, does have the power subsequently to
modify alimony provisions but must be extended to include these other
questions, for each has an important bearing on that issue. If this be so,
then it would seem that in practical application, this doctrine involves
too many questions and too many fine points (!f law, often not settled
under local law, for either the taxpayer or the commissioner to apply
with any degree of certainty. It leaves the taxpayer's liability entirely
too much to speculation and would require, before it could be definitely determined, a resort to the Supreme Court in every disputed case.
And in view of the uncertainty in the rule, such disputes seem inevitable.A final objection to the doctrine of Douglas v. Willcitts relates to
the questions that may arise in attempts to collect such a tax in the
event the husband becomes uncollectible or bankrupt. Would the
income in the hands of the wife be sufficientlv that of the husband's as
to be subject to a tax·lien, or subject to distraint because of his nonpayment? It would seem that the same arguments that exempted it
from taxation in the first instance would preclude its being subject to
tax liability in such case. Or will the corpus, irrevocably placed beyond
the control of the husband, be subjected to the satisfaction of the tax
claim? These questions remain to be answered. 21
This comment makes no attempt to answer the many questions it
raises. When the Court itself has failed to make clear the real meaning
25 An embarrassing question could be asked in this regard concerning the exemption allowed to a married man. Internal Revenue Code, 53 Stat. L. 18 (1939),
§ 25 (b) (1).
26 Query at this point, is he to be considered sufficiently the beneficiary of the
trust income that the corpus will be taxed to his estate upon his death under the
estate tax, Internal Revenue Code, 53 Stat. L. 121 (1939), § 8II (c) (1)? That
section provided for the inclusion in the gross estate of property which was transferred
by trust, in which the granter retained for life "the possession or enjoyment of, or
the right to the income from, the property."
27 It would be no answer to say that in such case the husband could petition the
court for a modification of the decree, for, as both the income and the corpus are
irrevocably beyond his control, a mere modification would be of little help to him.
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of Douglas v. Willcuts, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to try to predict what the answers might be. They were raised
for the purpose of showing that, far from being a solution to the problem of how to tax the income from a trust under these circumstances,28
the rule of Douglas v. Willcitts has created more problems than it
has solved. Conceding that "The evident general purpose of the statute
was to tax in some way the whole income of all trust estates," 20 and
that alimony is not tIDra;ble income, so that in this case some of the
trust income would escape taxation, it y;rould seem more desirable to
have awaited Congressional action, rather than to have imposed an
artificial rule by means of judicial legislation which results in such
arbitrary and unpredictable tax liability.3 ° Federal taxation should be
ba,sed on sound federal law and not on nice distinctions in the local law.
As was pointed out by Justice Reed,
"We are now at the point where the taxability of the settlor depends not only on the 'clear and convincing proof' of the finality
of the decree, but the ability to produce that proof depends upon
the skill of the draftsman of the settlement. Fine distinctions are
necessary m reasoning but most undesirable in a national tax
system." 81
Benjamin W. Franklin

28 The majority of the law review notes discussing Douglas v. Wtllcuts, cited in
note 4, supra, approve of the result.
29 Helvering v. Butterworth, 290 U.S. 365 at 369, 54 S. Ct. 221 (1933), quoted
in Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. I at IO, 56 S. Ct. 59 (1935).
so It would have been still better to hold that such income is taxable under §
161 (a) (2), quoted in note 15, supra.
81 Justice Reed, dissenting, Helvering v. Fuller, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 784
at 789.

